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Article 3

Pragmatism and Conscience: A Religious
Perspective on Competing Values in
Embryo Experimentation
by
Moira M. McQueen, Ph.D. and Fr. J. Leo Walsh

Dr. McQueen is a Senior Lecturer in Christian Ethics at the Faculty of
Theology, University of St. Michael's College, Toronto. There also, Fr.
Walsh is Associate Professor of Christian Ethics, teaching Fundamental
Christian Ethics and Medical Ethics.

Most people realize that key terms such as "Reproductive Technologies"
immediately involve us in the most major issues of our society. Yet a
spokesperson for Health Canada recently said that any new regulatory
body for reproductive technologies would include representatives of those
who oppose some of the proposed measures on religious and moral
grounds. The reason given was that: "This is not just a medical issue ... "1 It
is remarkable that this needed to be restated, and speaks volumes about our
overly specialized culture where we are sometimes too dependent on
science, which, taken in a narrow sense, reigns supreme.
Who we are in relation to one another is a fundamental issue for all
cultures. How we treat one another continues to shape our culture. We have
learned many lessons from history about how that has been done, and how
we continue to influence it. Culture is not something passive in which we
are immersed. It is true that we are strongly influenced by the society in
which we find ourselves, but society is itself a product of historical
conditioning, and in many ways we help to shape future society. Our values
lie at the heart of this task, and it is at this level that the shaping of culture
is the most challenging. Who are we? Why are we here? What is our
relationship to others? How do we treat each other? When does any
responsibility towards another begin? And, digging even more deeply,
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when and how does the other begin? Action based on these sorts of
questions will determine what our culture and society will become, and
therefore demand the most careful examination possible.
In Canada, a Royal Commission submitted its Report on Reproductive
Technologies to the Federal Government in 1993. 2 We will look at that
part of the Report which deals with embryo research. We will then examine
the Canadian government's move towards legislating in this area,3 in light
of its reliance on the Commission 's Report and on the guidelines on the
Canadian Tri-Council policy statement, "Ethical Conduct for Research
Involving Humans" , issued in 1998.4 We will analyze the ethical stance,
methodology and conclusions of all three. The National Institutes of
Health in the United States have also recently issued proposed new
guidelines dealing with stem cell retrieval from embryos, and we will look
at the changes in approach that they recommend. We will contrast what we
consider to be the "pragmatic" approach utilized by these bodies with the
approach to embryonic human life affirmed by Pope John Paul II in his
encyclical Humanae Vitae, the Gospel of Life. 5 We will also analyze the
papal ethical stance, methodology and conclusions. It should be pointed
out that his ethic is used not simply because it represents the stance of one
particular religion, that of the Roman Catholic community, but because, in
its espousal of natural law principles, that church has always claimed that
objective moral norms can be appreciated by humankind at large. We will
examine statements on the status of the embryo and embryo
experimentation made by some leading Roman Catholic theologians,
which reveal that opinion is far from unanimous in their ranks, despite
magisterial teaching. Finally, the statement of the one dissenter on the
Royal Commission will be analyzed. Overall, our aim is to look at how we
shape our culture through our decisions about experimentation on human
embryos.
The pragmatism we refer to in this presentation is the common - or
- garden type. We are not referring to any specific theory of philosophical
pragmatism, such as that represented by William James or John Dewey in
their rejection of formalism. We simply mean making a decision to follow
a course of action which will bring about certain desired results without
reference to the ethical or unethical nature of such action.
The Royal Commission
The Royal Commission recommended that some practices, e.g.,
surrogacy, should be banned in Canada, but did not advocate a ban on
embryo experimentation. 6 Taking account of the many intervenors who
demanded that the dignity of the zygote and embryo be respected, the
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Commission said that they "share the concern that zygotes be treated with
due respect."7 The commissioners noted that the zygote is human, that it is
alive, and that it "may have the potential to become a human being."8 The
Commission stated: ''These criteria alone confer a degree of moral status on
the fertilized egg, even at its earliest stages of development."9 It accorded
"a measure of respect and protection to it."IOIt did not define what "a
measure" means, but immediately went on to point out that, in Canadian
law, the embryo or fetus is not a person. Once this note is introduced, any
talk of respect becomes so amorphous as to be useless. The Commission
then adopted the current "14 days" standard, up to which some types of
experimentation should be considered acceptable. The reasons given were
that the 14 day limit "recognizes the legitimate value of medical knowledge
and the need to find a morally acceptable compromise in a pluralistic
society in which there are various views about the relative importance of
different stages of embryo development." 11 Quoting the Medical Research
Council, which existed independently before the Tri-Council, the
Commission noted that they thought the 14 days rule may accord with a
"pragmatic sense of ethical acceptability."12 The Commission cited other
proponents of the 14 days rule to support their stance, and stated: "We
believe that in a pluralistic society, this approach is reasonable, and indeed
is the only realistic basis for resolving certain ethical issues." 13
It is important to point out that the Commission's stated framework of
ethics did not include pragmatism as one of their espoused values. Chapter
3 of the report is entitled: "Ethical Framework and Guiding Principles."
Under the broad orientation of "the ethic of care", the Commission settled
on eight guiding principles. These were: autonomy, equality, respect for
human life and dignity, protection of the vulnerable, noncommercialization of reproduction, appropriate use of resources,
accountability, and balancing of individual and collective interests. 14 There
was no mention here of pragmatism.

Bill C-47
Following the Royal Commission's Report several years later, the
Canadian government proposed legislation in 1997, in the form of Bill C47. The preamble stated that Parliament is "gravely concerned about the
significant threat to human dignity" in reproductive technologies, and
recognizes the need for measures "to protect and promote the best interests
of children affected." 15 This could be supported by most people, and is in
the same vein as the report's stated intentions in declaring its ethics of care.
Until Section 7 the wording of the bill was very mild and cautious, but the
notion of experimentation was suddenly introduced in Section 7(3), which
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said that, "No person shall use a zygote or embryo for the purpose of
research or implantation in a woman unless the donors of the ovum and
sperm that produced it have consented to its use for that purpose."16 It is
understandable that zygotes and embryos would be destined for
implantation, since that is their main purpose in reproductive technologies,
but their use for research is an entirely different matter. There is a vast
difference between implantation and research, and it seems that the
distinction is somewhat papered over here because of their linkage in the
one clause. Richard McCormick uses the term "hineingeshmuggelt" for
this type of maneuver, when one concept is smuggled in under the
umbrella of another, less controversial concept. Perhaps this was not the
Bill's intent, yet its use of language in this section became exceedingly
pragmatic. Concepts such as "production" and "use" appeared, not the type
of language guaranteed to favor equal dignity and respect. It is clear that
there could have been no thought of recognition of autonomy of the
zygote/embryo here, if it is something that may be "used." The Bill did not
progress because of an election call in 1997, but is still expected to form
the basis of proposed new licensing regulations.
Tri-Council Policy Statement l7
The current Tri-Council Policy Statement on ethical conduct for
research involving humans is also likely to be influential on government
policy. In its ethical framework, it states that "research involving human
subjects is premised on a fundamental moral commitment to advancing
human welfare, knowledge and understanding, and to examining cultural
dynamics."'8 It continues: "Part of our core moral objection would concern
using another human solely as a means towards even legitimate ends."'9
The Tri-Council states that this objection, dependent on the familiar moral
imperative of respect for human dignity, means that it is unacceptable to
treat persons solely as means, because doing so fails to respect their
intrinsic human dignity and thus impoverishes all of humanity.2°(Emphasis
ours) . Further, it requires that the welfare and integrity of the individual
remain paramount in human research. 21(Emphasis ours). In its Guiding
Ethical Principles, the Tri-Council states that the common standards,
values, and aspirations of the research community, including respect for
human dignity, respect for free and informed consent, and respect for
vulnerable persons.22
Noting in Section 9 that the report of the Royal Commission is an
"authoritative and thorough analysis of current Canadian viewpoints,
reflecting both the divisions and areas of consensus within society on these
important matters", and that statements of government policy have arisen
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from the Report, the Tri-Council suddenly and somewhat baldly states:
"Informed by such public and scholarly discussions, this Policy suggests to
REB's a pragmatic positIOn on research involving human
reproduction. 2\Emphasis ours). In the next breath, the Tri-Council says
that this is " .. .broadly consistent with a graduated approach that correlates
permitted interventions with the developmental stages of the human
embryo or foetus",24 and later continues, " .. .in those cases where human
embryos are created for reproductive purposes, and subsequently are no
longer required for such purposes, research involving human embryos may
be considered to be ethically acceptable ... "25 Certain conditions apply, the
most important being that such research may only take place during the
first fourteen days.26 The explanation given for this is that it is " ... based on
the stages of biological development. Implantation usually begins at
approximately the sixth or seventh day of development, and is usually
completed around 14 days, beyond which time the embryo proper starts to
develop the primitive streak, or the first indication of neural
development."27 Many things could be disputed about this reasoning.
What does the timing of implantation have to do with the question of
human dignity? Why is the phrase "embryo proper" used in this context?
Anything that had been said so far in the Policy Statement speaks of
zygotes, embryos and fetuses; there is no mention of "the zygote proper",
"the embryo proper", or "the fetus proper" until now. The Council's
wording suggests that until 14 days the entity in existence is not an
embryo. Also, we note that while the development of the primitive streak
may become apparent at 14 days, there is nothing to suggest that before
that time the said embryo is less than a self-organizing organism that both
divides according to its own dynamics and produces what is termed the
primitive streak from within. It is difficult to see on scientific grounds that
the beginning of the primitive streak is the turning point of an entity into an
"embryo proper". The Tri-Council gives no other reasons for this
pragmatic decision, and we question why it abandoned its stated principles
concerning human dignity, respect for the vulnerable, the minimization of
harm, and other human protectives where these embryos are concerned.

National Institutes of Health
In the United States, the NIH are proposing new guidelines on
embryonic stem cell research which include a change in approach to
embryo experimentation similar to that proposed in Canada.28 They are
now recommending that stem cell research be done on week-old living
embryos. In a reversal of all legislation to date, these guidelines tell
researchers to let donor parents know that early embryos will not survive
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this process, but "will be handled respectfully, as is appropriate for all
human tissue used in research."29 The description of embryos as "tissue" is
telling in its deliberate downplaying of their human status. Justifying this
new departure by claiming that embryos used would be those "in excess of
clinical need", and which would otherwise be destroyed, the NIH are
prepared to depart from long-standing federal and international safeguards
on research concerning human subjects. 3D The word "pragmatism" comes
readily to mind once again.
One of the major reasons for allowing this experimentation is that
embryonic stem cells were thought to be the only source of pluripotent
cells, i.e., cells capable of forming all the different human tissue types.
This has enormous implications for human therapeutic purposes, and, as
far as the NIH are concerned, such benefits outweigh the destruction of the
embryos harvested - their human status is now ignored. Recently,
however, other scientists have shown exciting new advances in this field,
alternatives to using embryonic sources. Research has already shown, for
example, that stem cells from muscle tissue can produce different types of
blood cells, and bone marrow cells have produced other types oftissue.31 It
is not yet known if these stem cells cannot be made pluripotent, which
would shift the emphasis on the stated necessity of using embryonic
sources to the availability of adult sources. According to Origins, a leading
researcher in this field has already concluded that "there is a stem cell in
the adult bone marrow that is capable of becoming anything if you give it
the right signal ... "32 Further advances have been made in "immortalizing"
adult cell cultures and in maintaining adult stem cells in a relatively
undifferentiated state for months. 33 This means that embryonic stem cells
are not unique in their capacity for self-renewal, as has been thought, nor
are they unique in their capacity to create other types of tissue and cells.
The knowledge that pluripotent stem cells can be obtained from consenting
adults means that research should be encouraged in these areas and that
stem cell research on embryos cannot now be claimed to be "necessary". If
embryos are always to be respected as human, then destroying them to
harvest stem cells clearly assaults and destroys their dignity. The
pragmatic approach of the proposed Canadian and American guidelines
must be challenged by those who realize that any attack on the human
dignity of the embryo is also an attack on all human dignity. We must
never treat human subjects as a means. Not only is this abhorrent in itself,
but our own human dignity and security are thereby completely
compromised.
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The Official Teaching of the Roman Catholic Church
Another approach is not only possible, but would be in line with the
avowed statements of principle of these groups, who, by their decisions,
have the power to influence the shaping of our culture in a definitive way
by their willingness to allow experimentation on the human embryo. That
is the approach taken by the Roman Catholic Church, with its insistence on
following through on the principle of respect for human life at all its stages.
We stress that this is not an appeal to authority. The Royal Commission,
the Tri-Council, the NIH and the Roman Catholic Church all state
principles concerning respect for life. Only the Church shows consistency
in applying these principles universally.
With regard to recent teaching, a document issued in 1974 said that,
despite differing historical theological opinions on ensoulment (due, we
suggest, to false biology rather than dispute about hylomorphism), there
was never a doubt about the illicitness of abortion. 34 Where a human life
exists, it deserves protection whether or not ensoulment has taken place.
The Church did not want to become embroiled in philosophical
argumentation (which may have taken from the main point about the
protection of the unborn). So the Church 's argument for protection is
based not on an indisputable argument about the personal status of the
embryo, but rather on the fact that no philosophical argument, or, for that
matter scientific argument, can ever prove that the embryo is of less than
fully human status. For this reason the embryo must be treated as fully
human from the first moment of its life. By ignoring the probability of the
status of the embryo, one would show oneself as being prepared to kill a
human person.
In 1987, in Donum Vitae, the same Congregation repeated what it
had said in 1974. 35 In Pope John Paul's encyclical Evangelium Vitae,
Catholic teaching persists in what can be termed its consistent ethic of life.
John Paul is actually inviting us to penetrate to the heart of our culture by
asking us to reconsider its foundations - what are human rights, and,
more importantly, who qualifies as the subject of rights? His encyclical and
previous teachings make it plain that these questions are still not resolved
in our society, and part of the reason for that is our reluctance to confront
major ethical problems. Rather, we pretend that we have dealt with these
matters, but every new reproductive technology presents us with another
question about the worth and dignity of the human embryo, and what we
mayor may not do. These decisions are what shape us as a people, and
thereafter shape our culture. John Paul presents this as a choice between a
culture of death and a culture of life. And it is a real choice - we will
influence our pluralistic culture and its practices by this choice.
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Views of Some Roman Catholic Theologians
Roman Catholic theological opinion is not unanimous about the
personal status of the early human embryo.36 As Carol Tauer pointed out in
her 1985 article (see below), many theologians who deny personal status
simply ignore the claim of the Vatican documents that it is wrong to act in
a case of doubt about the personhood of the embryoY There have,
however, been several attempts to deny the validity of the Vatican's
principle, including that of Tauer herself.
1. Richard McCormick
McCormick refers to the classical example of a hunter firing into the
bushes when the movement might have been caused by his hunting
companion or by a wild animal. 38 Though in normal circumstances this
may be morally wrong, he says, if there were urgency in the case (food is
needed to feed the hunter's family, for example), then firing into the bushes
is morally justified. It would seem that this argument misses the point. It is
certainly true that urgency might persuade a rather scrupulous person that
he/she should act when there is no probability that a person's life is
involved, but rather, for all practical purposes it is impossible that a person
be present. However, this is a far cry from the probability of a person's
being present which is envisaged in the classical "hunter's case". In this
case, probability will not save the person's life should a life be at stake,
which is the answer of classical probabilism. Indeed, we begin to sense that
the cart is pulling the horse. In other words, the urgency of embryo
research is so demanding, that a solution "has to be found", and the
classical case becomes the vehicle of argumentation.

2. Lisa Sowle Cahill
Cahill believes that there is a growing importance to be placed on
developing fetal life. 39 The fetus, however, is never of such worth as to
override the right of the mother to preserve her own life through abortion.
Indeed, abortion may be morally right when chosen to preserve other
values in which the mother may have an interest greater than her own life. 40
Cahill does not provide examples of such values.
If the fetus were a person at any stage of existence, then it would be
equal in status to the mother. It is not surprising, then, that Cahill is
unwilling to recognize the personal status of the embryo. Cahill equates
the chances of the early embryo's being a person with the chance of a
derelict somehow having gotten under your car which was locked in a
garage. We disregard the latter possibility - we don't check under our cars
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each morning - and we should equally disregard the possibility of the
personal status of the embryo.41 It would seem that only a Lonerganian
"scotosis" (blindness) could provide a foundation for such a dismissal of
the probability of personal status for the embryo (See the arguments
referred to in endnote 36.). Even were a positive doubt to be admitted,
there would be sufficient probability about the personal status of the
embryo as to bar its being used, owned or directly killed. Further, no "has
special status but is less than personal" ascription will save the embryo
from any of the above. 42

3. Carol Tauer
Tauer argues that probabilism deals with the doubt of law/doubt of
fact distinction well known to probabilists. 43 She claims that facts are
empirically verifiable and, since the status of the embryo cannot be proven
empirically, then we are not dealing with a doubt of fact. We are dealing,
she says, with a theoretical doubt, and this is more akin to a doubt of law.
There is much to be said about this article. Suffice to say here that a
definition of "fact" does not solve the question. The existence of many of
our deepest truths is not empirically verifiable. I cannot so prove that I am
loved by God or by any human person. These truth claims, however, fall
within the principle of non-contradiction. They are true or they are not
true. And that is what is important when we think about the personal status
of the early embryo. It is a person or it is not. That we cannot prove the
matter empirically does not license us to treat the embryo as less than one
of us, as human persons.

Dissenting Opinion on the Royal Commission
The final part of our paper deals with the dissent written by a member
of the Royal Commission, Suzanne Scorsone, on the topic of embryo
experimentation. Was it a case of pragmatism versus conscience for her?
Scorsone based her objections to embryo experimentation on the fact that
the same norms of research should apply to them as to all other human
subjects. She stressed that "embryo research is the only form of research
on human subjects in which those norms are disregarded."44 She thought it
important to point out the difference between embryo experimentation and
abortion. In the first case, there is no conflict between the desires, health or
welfare of the mother and the embryo, and no balancing of rights. Many
people who are pro-choice concerning abortion think that, when such
conflict is absent, the embryo has great significance and value. Others
simply fear the instrumentalization of the human. Scorsone went on to
remind us that the Commission adopted ethical principles within its
overriding "ethic of care". She agreed with these principles, which
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included non-maleficence, protection of the vulnerable, informed consent
and respect for life. An embryo used for experimentation is human, and
therefore deserves the respect due to all members of the human race: it is
certainly vulnerable, it cannot give informed consent, and it is known that
it will die. Scorsone stated: "I do not see how these principles can be
consistent with experimentation on embryos resulting in their death."45 We
agree.
Scorsone's dissent raises many further points demonstrating reasons
for treating human embryos with respect, but the major fact to be stressed
here is that the Commission violated its own principles where the human
embryo is concerned.
Conclusion
We have looked at the topic of embryo experimentation through
examining the ethical stances of the Royal Commission on Reproductive
Technologies, the Canadian government, the Tri-Council's Policy
Statement, the proposed guidelines of the NIH, the Roman Catholic
Church, some Roman Catholic theologians and the one dissenter on the
Royal Commission. We conclude that the first four bodies have adopted a
pragmatic approach to embryo experimentation, an approach which
breaches the principles that they carefully set out, and which they apply in
all other cases concerning human beings. The Roman Catholic approach,
and that taken by the dissenter on the Commission, applies the same
principles to the human embryo as to any other human being. The Roman
Catholic theologians quoted are doubtful of the full personal status of the
early embryo, and therefore could support destructive experimentation.
The ethical question which persists is whether the "pragmatic" approach
being recommended for legislation in both Canada and the United States
bodies is justified. In light of their previous guidelines and regulations we
do not see how such a position could be ethical or logical. We hope that any
new regulatory body in this field will reexamine the principles adopted
thus far, and conclude that new support for embryo experimentation,
despite its apparent potential for medical advancement, is not something
that will benefit our society and culture in a truly human way, just as no
other kind of experimentation on human subjects can benefit humanity if it
disregards the dignity of persons. In the words of John Paul II, the Church
"wants simply to promote a human state. A state which recognizes the
defense of the fundamental rights of the human person, especially of the
weakest, as its primary duty."46
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